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1COMMENTARY ON MICHEL DUFOUR’S “WHAT MAKES A FALLACY SERIOUS?”
[for OSSA 12]
The focus of Professor Dufour’s essay is a distinction introduced by Douglas Walton between 
non-serious and serious errors or, alternatively, between blunders and fallacies.  Dufour’s 
question is by what criterion Walton intends to distinguish the two kinds of errors.  I am glad to 
join in this investigation.
Walton appears to have offered two different ways of marking the distinction.  (1) The dialogue-
goal distinction: Rule breakings that do not block the progress of a dialogue towards its goal are 
non-serious, whereas rule breakings that do block progress toward the goal of a dialogue are 
serious  (and so, fallacies).  (2)  The intentionality distinction: Errors committed unintentionally 
are non-serious blunders whereas dialogue violations committed intentionally to take unfair 
advantage of an opponent are sophisms (and so, fallacies).
Professor Dufour finds both distinctions wanting and, if we look closely, we see that Walton 
himself was not completely at ease with either one of them.  Both his A Pragmatic Theory of 
Fallacies (1995) and Methods of Argumentation (2013) books are replete with qualifications, 
varying perspectives and digressions without ever giving us a precise criterion for the difference 
between non-serious errors and serious fallacies.  As Dufour reads Walton, the best we have is a 
gradual difference, never a sharply drawn one. ‘Serious’ is vague.
WALTON’S DISTINCTIONS:
Three distinctions are central to Walton’s pragmatic theory of fallacies.  
(i) non-serious errors vs serious errors
(ii) blunders vs fallacies
(iii) unintentional errors vs intentional deceptions
A plausible reading of Walton is that the terms to the left of ‘vs’ all go together: small errors and 
blunders are also unintentional and might be forgivable.  On the right side of ‘vs’ there is less 
agreement, however.  It is not clear that intentional deceptions are errors, serious or otherwise. 
Another of Walton’s distinction also has a prominent role in his discussion,
  (iv) paralogisms vs sophisms.
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‘Paralogism’  (παραλογισων ) may be the Greek word for fallacy since it is frequently translated 
as ‘fallacy’ in, for example, Aristotle’s De Sophisticis Elenchis, and since, in Aristotle’s view, 
fallacies could be intended, ‘paralogism’ doesn’t fit well with the other left-hand terms which 
seem to be intention-free.  Sometimes Walton identifies paralogisms with non-serious errors.
We might capture some of what Walton had in mind by the following definitions.
Paralogisms are non-relational errors in arguments, i.e., in premise-conclusion units. The error is
internal to the argument and independent of its relation to other turns in the dialogue.  For 
example, “the error of jumping to a conclusion without properly considering the critical 
questions that should be asked” (2013, 217-18).  In Walton’s view, paralogisms are instances of 
argument schemes which allows for the possibility that there can be both strong and weak 
instances of the schemes, the weak instances being paralogisms, non-serious errors but also, 
sometimes, fallacies.
Sophisms are relational errors in the use of arguments in dialogical interactions.  In saying the 
error is relational it is meant that the error is external to the argument (the premise-conclusion 
unit) and resides in the argument’s use in relation to other turns in the dialogue in which it 
occurs.  Some passages support this characterization of sophisms.
“Most of the fallacies are fallacious moves in a dialogue not because of the inherent 
unreasonableness of the argument but because of the way it is used in a sequence of 
moves to try to prevent the respondent from questioning it or even continuing the 
dialogue at all.” (2013, 215)
The fallacy is found not in the argumentation scheme, as applied to a single argument , 
but in a pattern that can be found only by examining a connected sequence of moves by 
both parties” (2013, 216)
These distinctions are elaborated below,
COMMENTS ON WALTON’S DF OF FALLACY
I don’t accept (i) Walton’s premise that  Aristotle thought fallacies were sophistical refutations 
(1995, 232, 244) nor the  view that (ii) a fallacy = a sophistical refutation.  Aristotle’s sophistical 
refutations are sophistical because they are would-be refutations that fail; and they fail because 
they contain a pseudo-syllogism or paralogism, i.e., a fallacious argument (premise-conclusion 
unit).  The argument would be a fallacy whether or not it was used in a refutation. In my view, 
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equating sophistical refutation with fallacies is a systematically misleading mistake (Woods and 
Hansen, 1997). 
I also disagree with Walton’s remark (1995: 241) that the definition of ‘fallacy’ as “an argument 
that seems valid but is not,” is (i) glib, and (ii) found in most modern logic text books.  This 
concept of fallacy has (mistakenly) become known as the “standard df of ‘fallacy’” (hereafter 
SDF).  True, it is a short definition but it turns on three sophisticated concepts tightly woven 
together – each of them a technical concept that can be clearly defined.  Walton’s use of the word
‘glib’ (and ‘shallow’ (244)) in connection with SDF show his strategic manoeuvring to make his 
case against SDF and for his own pragmatic account.  As for the second part of Walton’s remark, 
it is not factually true that this is the definition of fallacy found in most modern logic textbooks.  
It’s in very few.  The only one I know of is Wesley Salmon’s Logic (Hansen, 2002).  Anyone: 
Tell me of others, please, if you find them.
Leaving our disagreements on the side for now,  let us consider how Walton changes the focus of
fallacy analysis.  
Whereas Aristotle analysed sophistical refutations in terms of arguments that had gone wrong, 
Walton analysed them in terms of dialogues that had gone wrong.  The lesser faults may in some 
cases be traceable to arguments (paralogisms) but for Walton, serious errors, fallacies, are 
interactional in nature.  Walton’s move allows the possibility that there are bad dialogues that do 
not owe their misfortune to an argument being bad.
Dufour’s observation that Walton tried to tread the water between two poles of fallacy theory, the
logical and dialectical poles, is insightful.  He identifies the dialectical pole with the Pragma-
dialectical school and he could have identified the logical (or epistemic) pole with “the standard 
treatment” or with the work of Larry Powers, or Biro and Siegel.
Walton acknowledged that his theory of what he called “the traditional fallacies” does not 
include most of the Aristotelian fallacies.  His list of twelve  (2013, 220) fallacies is largely post-
Aristotelian; only three of them bear a resemblance to Aristotle’s extended list (that would 
include the ones mentioned in the Rhetoric).  Powers saw himself as a defender of Aristotelian 
ideas, and from his point of view Aristotle’s thirteen fallacies in Sophistical Refutations are all  
language dependent, and Walton’s post-Aristotelian list is at best a bunch of quasi-fallacies.  
Walton’s embraced the Aristotelian idea of studying fallacies as they occur in dialogue; in fact, 
he thought that fallacies must be understood as occurring in dialogue.  How then should we 
explain that Walton’s dozen-or-so fallacies have little in common with Aristotle’s dozen-or-so 
fallacies?  One hypothesis is that the difference is due to the differences between the Greek and 
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English languages.  A better hypothesis is that Aristotle in Topics and Sophistical Refutations was
primarily interested in philosophical discussions, whereas Walton was more interested in extra-
philosophical issues: popular discourse and everyday argumentation.  Hence, Aristotle’s fallacies 
highlight pitfalls of philosophical discussions and Walton’s those of the less technical everyday 
argumentations in which we engage. (On another occasion we may wonder whether any of 
Walton’s types of dialogue are suitable for philosophical discussions.)
Walton’s definition of fallacy has six necessary conditions (1995, 237-38; repeated in 2013, 213-
14).  The first three are variations on SDF with very relaxed conditions.  The fourth condition 
tells us that fallacies can only be understood as occurring in dialogues.  The fifth, that a fallacy is
the misuse of an underlying, systematic technique, and the sixth condition that it must be more 
than a blunder, it must be a serious mistake.  Professor Dufour and I agree that the last three 
conditions, the ones that most markedly set Walton’s view apart from SDF, are problematic.
Professor Dufour is right to point out that for some fallacies, especially the language dependent 
ones, we do not need a context of dialogue to understand them as fallacies.  In what kind of 
dialogue would equivocal inferences not be a serious error?  This challenges Walton’s 
requirement that fallacies must be understood in the context of dialogues.  Maybe Walton’s 
thought was that the language dependent fallacies, since they do not have both good and bad 
instances, are not instances of argument kinds and so they cannot be misused kinds of arguments,
and hence they cannot be fallacies.  However, Walton saw that the language dependent fallacies 
could infect any argument that is an instance of a scheme thereby weakening it.  Hence, 
Aristotle’s language dependent fallacies can be errors in all  contexts where Walton’s schemes 
can be used and where a minimal standard of reasonableness is expected (2013, 223). therefore, 
context is not needed to understand these errors; and, a kind of dialogue being a kind of context, 
dialogues are not needed.  So, this is an argument against the view that a piece of discourse is a 
fallacy (a serious error) only if it blocks the attainment of the goal of a dialogue.  The dialogue 
fragment will be recognizable as a fallacy even if it is not in a dialogue.  The possibility remains 
open that blocking the progress of a dialogue is a sufficient condition for being a fallacy.  (An 
alternative conclusion is that the language dependent fallacies aren’t  fallacies.)
(Walton’s acknowledgment that ambiguity fallacies can infect any of the arguments derived from
schemes thereby turning those arguments into fallacies unwittingly brings him close to Powers’ 
view (and maybe Aristotle’s) that fallacy, wherever it occurs, is due to an embedded ambiguity 
(Powers, 1995).)
The fifth condition of fallacy-hood Walton gives us is that it must be a misuse of an underlying, 
systematic technique.  Interestingly, the concept of a technique of argumentation drops out of the
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2013 discussion, but it was central to Walton’s various attempts to define fallacy in the 1995 
book.  Dufour does not single the concept out for attention.  
Some passages consider being a misused argumentation technique to be a sufficient condition to 
be a fallacy.  Walton said that his pragmatic theory “defines a fallacy as an argumentation 
technique used wrongly,” (1995, 237) and “Fallacies are techniques of argumentation that have 
been used in a counter-productive way ...” (1995, 258).  It may be advisable, therefore, if we are 
to understand Walton’s concept of fallacy, to think about what an argument technique might be.  
He takes argument technique to a be a broader concept than argument tactic, and writes as 
follows. 
[A]rgumentation tactics and techniques can be codified in rules or heuristic pieces of 
advice that counsel a participant on how to fulfil his goal in a particular context of 
dialogue ... Such tactical rules advise a participant on how to defend his own arguments 
in the exchange and how to criticize or attack the arguments advanced by the other 
participant. (1995, 28)
... a careful distinction needs to be made between the general concept of fallacy as a type 
of argumentation technique and the concept of fallacy as a particular instance of a fault or
failure of argumentation in a given case. (1995, 259)
... the new theory [of  fallacies] is pragmatic because it involves judgment of how well a 
technique has been used in a particular case. (ibid)
A technique is a way of doing something, a kind of skill to accomplish a goal.  There is a 
technique of lacing your shoes, another of trimming the hedges, and there are techniques of 
rational persuasion.  To be master of a technique is to have know-how of what steps to take to 
bring about the result the technique is for.  Aristotle thought there were three means of 
persuasion: ethos, pathos and logos, each requiring a different way to bring success.  His are 
perhaps techniques in a very broad way. Walton is after techniques more narrowly construed.  He
mentions three of Locke’s four ways of gaining assent as examples (1995, 260).  Since these are 
also known as kinds of arguments, it must be that the argumentation techniques Walton had in 
mind are the uses of argument kinds like appeal to expertise, argument by analogy, circumstantial
ad hominem, etc., (2013, 220) as means of holding up an arguer’s side in a dialogue.  These 
argument kinds and others like them all have an acceptable place in argumentation, and because 
they have the air of correctness about them any misuse of these argument kinds may have the 
semblance of legitimacy about them.  To speak of the argument kinds as techniques is different 
than considering them as schemes or kinds of arguments (which are objects) because a technique 
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involves a doing, a trying to bring something about: techniques involve, in Tindale’s (1999) 
memorable phrase, “acts of arguing”.  I think this is the main idea Walton wanted to hang his hat 
on in the 1995 book.  Shift the focus from failures of deductive validity to failures in the 
techniques of using defeasible arguments relative to argument goals.  All the stuff about 
paralogisms and blunders is a broom for sweeping up what is left over of the fallacies tradition 
after the idea of fallacy as a misused argument technique has been put at the centre of fallacy 
theory.  
We have been distracted.  Dufour’s quest is for Walton’s demarcation of non-serious errors from 
fallacies (serious errors).  What are we to make of the qualification, “serious”?
The following diagram, based on Walton’s (1995, 260) introduces a new distinction which we 
may add to the four we noticed earlier,
(v) a weak execution of a technique vs a misuse of a technique
We see in the accompanying chart (1995, 260) that this distinction corresponds to the non-serious
vs serious distinction 
Satisfactory execution Weak Execution Misuse (abuse)
Not-fallacy Fallacy
No error Non-serious error   ---------------------------------- Serious error
Walton considered non-serious errors as blunders that need not impede the goal of a dialogue, 
and so sometimes he did not consider them to be fallacies (but sometimes he did). He gave a 
scant number of examples of blunders.  (i) A blunder can be a breaking of a rule of reasoned 
dialogue as the Pragma-dialectical theory holds: but “Violating a rule of a critical discussion 
should not be itself equated with the committing of  a fallacy, for some such violations are 
merely blunders and not fallacies (2013, 214; also 1995, 233), said Walton.  (Curiously, he also 
said that this makes the Amsterdam theory too narrow  (2013, 214), but it seems rather to make it
too broad, encompassing things that he thought should not be included.)  (ii) Inadvertently 
arguing in a circle resulting in a weak argument can be a blunder and not a fallacy in some 
dialogues (1995, 234).  (iii) Blunders are not logical fallacies and they are not dangerous to the 
talk exchange of which they are apart.  (ibid. – but unclear what Walton means by ‘logic’ here).  
(iv) Calling “Arguments or argument strategies that are flawed, weak or poorly presented, or that
suffer from specific gaps or shortcomings that can be clarified or corrected in subsequent 
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dialogue” (1995, 234-35) fallacies is not recommended.  This last suggestion for distinguishing 
the seriousness of errors is interesting because  we might see a difference between corrections 
that can be made within dialogue and those that require entrance into a sub-dialogue, the latter 
being the more serious frustration.  But none of these examples lead us to a sharp distinction, or 
even a practical maxim, whereby we can  demarcate non-serious and serious errors.
We may be reminded of Joseph’s remark (1916, 569; repeated in Hamblin 1970, 13) that “error is
infinite in its aberrations”.  The errors that matter most and must be distinguished in the infinity, 
thought Walton, are the ones most liable to upset a dialogue towards its goal; they are the ones 
that fully deserve the name of ‘fallacy’.  Other errors deserve the appellation less so but tradition 
has included them as fallacies.  Walton response is to say that they are non-serious errors – not 
serious from the point of view of the dialogues in which they occur – and better deserve the 
name ‘blunder’.  A nice distinction for sure, but what is it?
It is not just logical seriousness that is at stake (whatever Walton means by ‘logical’) in sorting 
the non-serious from the serious errors.  He thought there were also social considerations (1995: 
234).  It is not advisable for the sake of the success of a dialogue to call every misstep a fallacy 
because interlocutors may be offended by this and consequently alter the nature of their 
participation in the dialogue.  For example, they may become less cooperative and/or more 
aggressive.  Better it would be to ask questions of the transgressor to help  them correct the non-
serious error, than to charge her with a fallacy.  This digression into the prudential conduct of 
dialogues prepares the way for a moral distinction introduced below.
ON THE QUESTION OF INTENTIONALITY
Is intending to deceive an interlocutor a necessary condition for being more than a blunder, a 
fallacy?  This idea is floated by Walton.
Walton’s view was that “the sophistical tactics type of fallacy tends to be a more serious kind of 
problem than the error in a reasoning one” (2013, 218. ) One of his characterization of sophisms 
is that of an interactional sequence of moves that are intended attempts to get the better of a 
dialogue partner through unfair means.  Let this then be the distinction we are looking for 
between the non-serious and the serious dialogue misdemeanours: the serious ones are 
intentional sophisms and the non-serious ones are unintentional paralogisms.  
But Walton is not really satisfied with this intention-based distinction because he has another 
characterization of a sophism.  It is a dialogue-rule violation carried out in a series of moves.  
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Admittedly, there are intentional sophisms perpetrated on the unwitting, but sophisms understood
this second way can also be unintended.  Walton spoke of arguer’s who were so committed to 
their point of view that they were blindly unaware  that they were committing sophisms.  If that 
is possible, then not all unacceptable move-sequences are intentional (2013, 218).  Hence, the 
violation  (the sophism) would  reside in the misuse of an argumentation technique (series of 
moves) that is prohibited by the dialogue, not in the intentions of an arguer.  So, if sophisms are 
more serious than paralogisms then what makes them more serious is not the intention of the 
arguer.  
Still, Walton’s view seems to be that the intentional sophisms are the most serious transgressions 
an arguer can commit.  Dufour has the insight that this may be because it is morally wrong to 
take advantage of another person, to deny them the game by the rules in which they had agreed 
to participate.  If this is so, then the non-serious / serious distinction is not one found within 
either logical or dialogical theory but within moral theory.  Viewed from another point of view, 
to have a dialogical theory that can rank sophisms as the most egregious of all fallacies, we must 
include  moral rules among our dialogue rules. 
Dufour is right to remind us that errors, mistakes and blunders are unintended.  Violations, 
infractions and rule-breakings can be unintended or intended, but tricks and deception are 
intentional.   If Walton’s view is that sophisms are techniques of argumentation intentionally 
used to gain an unfair advantage in dialogue then, strictly speaking, they are not errors and hence
not serious errors.   But I wouldn’t hang too much on this semantic point.  What we need to do is 
to understand what Walton meant and what we ourselves mean, and to that end I do not resist 
calling intentional sophisms errors. 
Connected to the intentionality question is the question of how it is possible to deceive a partner-
in-argument by the use of an argumentative technique.  It must be that the argument-receiver 
(and sometimes the argument-sender) mistakes a bad use of the technique for an acceptable use 
of the technique, and presumably this is because the bad use does not appear to be a bad use to 
the receiver. Perhaps the exchanges in the dialogue have created a psychological climate that has 
lowered the critical participation of the dialoguers.  Those who think that the appearance 
condition – the potential of a weak argumentation to pass as a strong argumentation – is part of 
the concept of a fallacy and/or sophism owe us an account of how this false appearance is 
generated.  Aristotle, Powers, and Sally Jackson (1995, ISSA 3)  have all worked on this with 
varying degrees of success.  Walton thought that those who argue sophistically intend their 
arguing to appear better than it really is, but in his 1995 and 2013 work he gives us no account of
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how one can do this.  (But see, his “Why fallacies appear to be better arguments than they are,”  
Informal Logic 30 (2010), 159-84.)
CONCLUSION
I have not been able to offer Professor Dufour any real help with his project of settling on 
Walton’s distinction between non-serious and serious fallacies.  The best I can do is to say that I 
think the dialogue-goal distinction is Walton’s main concern and the moves that are most likely 
to upset the reaching of the shared goal are more serious errors than the ones that are reparable 
along the way.  But pragmatic theories, because of their focus on the use of language, rather than 
the semantics and syntax, invariably lead us to consider particular cases and their contexts; 
hence, they resist precise distinctions that will hold over a range of different cases.  Maybe 
Walton told us all he could about the non-serious/serious error distinction in his pragmatic theory
of fallacies. 
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